Language and Thought / Did language evolve for thought?

Language and Thought, Center for Brains, Minds and Machines


Patrick H. Winston:

The 'combinator capability' [that differenciates humans from Neanderthals and primates] allows description, and once you got description there's a trail that can lead you all the way up to the 'strong story hypothesis'
[+/- min 18:40]

Story understanding is very fundamental to any real understanding of human intelligence.

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Steven Pinker:

Example: The story of how How doctors killed President Garfield 

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Susan Carey:

What makes conceptual development possible, and what makes it so hard?

How is it, we are the only animals who can think thoughts formulated on concepts like cancer or infinity or wisdom or carborator? What makes this possible? The acquisition of concepts, possible?

Cognitive science has the theoretical and methodological tools to answer both questions.

Probably the most seminal work on this classical set of issues has happened at MIT, both in the linguistics department (Chomsky) and the AI department and the brain and cognitive science department.

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Gennaro Chierchia: 

On language understanding and intelligence.

To use a conceptual system you need to run through a logic. We are trying to figure out the blueprint of this logic.

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Q&A:

Q: – On the many levels of meaning (literal meanings, enriched meanings...): How does this affect your research when you work with young children and you test their understanding of number words? In these tasks you have to give them full sentences, you have to ask them things like: "Can you give me two cookies..."

A: – Susan Carey answers.

A: – Gennaro Chierchia answers.

Q: – Do you see any role for the more logical part of the vocabulary. Whether you think that it really needs to be modeled in a precise way to make sense of people understanding stories?

A: – Patrick Winston answers. "How can we humans make ourselves smarter? –  If we want to make ourselves smarter, draw pictures and talk, because we have tremendous problem solving power in our visual and linguistics systems. So, to make ourselves smarter, we have to engage these systems, and one way to engage them is to draw pictures and talk. You can't do that when you're answering your email. You can only do that when you're taking notes, with a pencil and drawing, and engaging your language system. The miracle of human language and visual processing systems."

Q: – On language as a vehicle of thought. Language learning is partly like mapping. There's another idea that working in linguistics suggests, that is that natural language IS the language of thought.

A: – Steven Pinker answers. "It's very unlikely that any language that we speak, is a language of thought. There are a lot of experiments that show that. The actual sentences that we speak don't make the kinds of distinctions that are relevant for inference. I'm very skeptical of the idea for which language, as it's ordinarily understood, is what we think in. Although I do think that there is a representation that, in some regards, is language-like. It makes categorical distinctions, it is hierarchically structured, that is very closely related, though not identical to what we think as the semantic representations that align sentences."

A: – Susan Carey answers. "Another problem with identifying language with thought is that, if you do so, you stipulate that other animals can't think. But it partly depends what you mean by 'thought', as what you mean by 'language', because other animals have very powerful abstract conceptual representations, that they can draw inferences over. They have many of the same core cognition systems that human babies do. So you'd have to define that as not thought if you want to make that stipulation.

Gennaro Chierchia adds: "We really work on the functional architecture of language, and that involves such interesting words as: and - or - if - any - not - even - only - 'ing'... And that is where you find what is the most common throughout the languages of the world and also where some key dimensions of variotions take place."

Q: – Susan Carey: "Can animals represent the conditional. Do they have anything like the concept 'not' or 'or'? The evidence is probably yes, but not clear."

Patrick Winston: "I think there is an inner language and I think it came before communication. partly because, there's no point in saying anything if you don't have anything to say. And I think our external language emerged in part because we're social animals and our external language is of great benefit in thinking because I think there's a great deal of creativity in creative misunderstanding of what other people say. But I think there are computational reasons why the inner language ought to be simpler, more economical, because we have to compare things, we have to match them, and it would be extraordinarily difficult from a computational point of view, to try to do that with the raw uncannonicalized language stream. So we can't match a story in the newspaper to Cinderella and say, 'oh that's a Cinderella story', unless we have reduced the story and Cinderella to a kind of inner language in which there's movement through space, there's a capacity to express emotion, there's a capacity to express social relationships... And I think that those kinds of things constitute the inner language, and when they're rendered in simple form they make possible this kind of analogizing and precedent-based reasoning that is fundamental to human thought, and I'll bet you pansies don't do it because they'd be a lot smarter if they did."

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The importance of analogies. Analogy is extremely important to create new representational resources. But it doesn't mean we understand how it works. (Carey and Chierchia)

On metaphors and on how analogical the human mind is. Every sentence has some kind of concrete image behind it. (Pinker)

On Takatoshi Kato's predictions / suit-and-tie-wearing hotshots

"These were days before I decided to climb up the mountain, speak slowly and in a priestly tone, and try shaming people rather than insulting them. Listening to Kato's presentation, I could not control myself and flew into a rage in front of two thousand Koreans – I was so angry that I almost started shouting in French, forgetting that I was in Korea. I ran to the podium and told the audience that the next time someone in a suit and tie gave them projections for some dates in the future, they should ask him to show what he had projected in the past – in this case, what he had been forecasting for 2008 and 2009 (the crisis years) two to five years earlier, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. They would then verify that highly Venerable Kato-san and his colleagues are, to put it mildly, not very good at this predictionizing business. And it is not just Mr. Kato: our track record in figuring out significant rare events in politics and economics is not so close to zero; it is zero."

"What was getting me in that state of anger was my realization that forecasting was not neutral. It is all in the iatrogenics. Forecasting can be downright injurious to risk-takers – no different from giving people snake oil medicine in place of cancer treatment, or bleeding, as in the story of Geaorge Washington. And there was evidence. Danny Kahneman – rightfully – kept admonishing me for my fits of anger and outbursts at respectable members of the establishment (respectable for now), deeming such behavior to be unbecoming of the wise member of the intelligentsia I was supposed to be. Yet he stoked my frustration and sense of outrage the most by showing me the evidence of iatrogenics. There are ample empirical findings to the effect that providing someone with a random numerical forecast increases his risk taking, even if the person knows the projections are random.
All I hear is complaints about forecasters, when the next step is obvious yet rarely taken: avoidance of iatrogenics from forecasting. We understand childproofing, but not forecaster-hubris-proofing."

The financier Warren Buffett states that he tries to invest in businesses that are "so wonderful that an idiot can run them. Because sooner or later, one will."
Nassim Taleb, in Antifragile

Quando a incompetência ajuda

"The famine in China that killed 30 million people between 1959 and 1961 can enlighten us about the effect of the state "trying hard." Xin Meng, Nancy Qian, and Pierre Yared examined its variations between areas, looking into how the famine was distributed. They discovered that famine was more severe in areas with higher food production in the period before the famine began, meaning that it was government policy of food distribution that was behind much of the problem, owing to the inflexibility in the procurement system. And indeed, a larger than expected share of famine over the past century has occured in economies with central planning.
But often it is the state's incompetence that can help save us from the grip of statism and modernity – inverse iatrogenics. The insightful author Dmitri Orlov showed how calamities were avoided after the breakdown of the Soviet state because food production was inefficient and full of unintentional redundancies, which ended up working in favor of stability. Stalin played with agriculture, causing his share of famine. But he and his successors never managed to get agriculture to become "efficient," that is, centralized and optimized as it is today in America, so every town had the staples growing around it. This was costlier, as they did not get benefits of specialization, but this local lack of specialization allowed people to have access to all varieties of food in spite of the severe breakdown of institutions. In the United States, we burn twelve calories in transportation for every calorie of nutrition; in Soviet Russia, it was one to one. One can imagine what could happen to the United States (or Europe) in the event of food disruptions. Further, because of the inefficiency of housing in the Soviet state, people had been living in close quarters for three generations, and had tight bonds that ensured – as in the Lebanese war – that they stayed close to each other and lent to each other. People had real links, unlike in social networks, and fed their hungry friends, expecting that some friend (most likely another one) would help them should they get in dire circumstances.
And the top-down state is not necessarily the one that has the reputation of being so."
Nassim Taleb, in Antifragile